Abstract. This paper suggests a novel cooperative game-theoretic approach to
decentralized system, each divisional manager identifies independent opportunities other than the opportunity of trading internally with other divisions. Then, each division estimates the performance measures (revenues or profits) of each opportunity and selects the best opportunity. As a result, the transfer pricing system focuses on the maximization of divisional income, leading the divisions to achieve the goals of the firm through sub-optimization. However, sub-optimizations by individual divisions do not result in an optimum for the firm.
The transfer pricing problem needs to solve transfer prices considering that each division independently purchases goods from an upstream division in the supply chain. Transfer prices are determined in such a way that divisional sub-optimizations imply an overall optimum for the firm as whole. Then, transfer pricing problem has to consider the allocation of a global profit between subsidiaries or divisions of a firm. As a result, it is usually employed for tax avoidance by firms that lower profits in subsidiaries or divisions located in high-tax places and increase profits in divisions located in low-tax places. Because it is considered an instrument for allocating the total profit of a multidivisional firm, transfer pricing plays a fundamental role in the decision making for buying or selling subsidiaries or divisions [15] .
Related works
Related works presented in the literature have identified that the transfer pricing problem is inherently a multi-objective problem for optimally and developed transfer pricing methodologies based on mathematical programming and game theory. The seminal paper on transfer pricing was presented by Hirshleifer [15] who considering a system that focus on the maximization of divisional income suggested that the precise transfer price for a good is the marginal cost of the producing division. Horst [16] explored the profit-maximizing strategy for a monopolistic firm selling to two national markets simultaneously. Kassicieh [18] presented a model of transfer pricing that is developed further to include all of the issues that affect the total profits of the multinational corporation through transfer prices and expanded to include economic externalities and interdependencies such as nonlinear cost functions and functional relationships among demand, supply and transfer prices. Luft and Libby [22] examined experienced managers' judgments about the effects of market price and accounting profit information on negotiated transfer prices. Lakhal [19] developed a method using a mathematical programming model and providing companies an opportunity to work proactively with the internal revenue service in a cooperative manner in order to avoid costly audit and litigation. Lakhal et al. [20] proposed a framework and methodology for profit sharing and transfer-pricing between network companies presenting a paradigm that enables maximization of operating profits by the manufacturing-network in its
Main results
Transfer pricing is related to the pricing of an intermediate product or service within a firm. The products or services are collaborative transferred or relocated between divisions of the firm. As a consequence, transfer pricing refers to the allocation of profits in a supply chain. Encouraged by the significant impact of transfer pricing methods for tax purposes on operational decisions and the corresponding profits of a supply chain we propose a model for a multidivisional firm in a vertically integrated supply chain. We suggest a new game-theoretic approach to solve transfer prices considering that each division purchases goods from an upstream division in the supply chain, and in which transfer prices are determined in such a way that divisional sub-optimizations imply an overall optimum for the firm as whole. The main results of this paper are as follows:  We propose a method for computing the transfer pricing for a multidivisional firm.  We suggest a multi-objective approach for representing a cooperative game.  For computing the strong Nash equilibrium, the method finds the Pareto optimal point with minimal distance to the utopia point. [3, 2, 13] method is used to guarantee the convergence to a single (strong) equilibrium point.  We propose a method based on a penalized programming approach for computing the regularized strategies of the game.  We develop a programming method to solve the successive single-objective constrained problems that arise from taking the regularized functional of the game.  We implement a recurrent procedure based on the gradient method to solve the regularized problem and finding the Pareto optimal strategies.  We show that in the regularized problem the functional of the game decreases and finally converges, proving the existence and uniqueness of strong Nash equilibrium.  In addition, we present the convergence conditions and compute the estimate rate of convergence of variables  and  corresponding to the step size parameter of the regularized penalty method.  We provide all the details needed to implement the method in an efficient and numerically stable way.  The usefulness of the method is successfully demonstrated by a numerical example.
Organization of the paper
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next Section suggests the formulation of the problem for transfer pricing. Section 3 presents the cooperative game model describing the Pareto front, the restrictions over jurisdictions imposed by governments and the strong Nash equilibrium of the problem. Section 4 describes the regularized penalty function optimization method. Section 5 concludes the paper with some remarks and future work. The appendix presents the proofs of the theorems.
Formulation of the problem
Transfer pricing refers to the pricing of an intermediate product or service within a firm. This product or service is transferred between divisions of the firm. Thus, transfer pricing is closely related to the allocation of profits in a supply chain.
Problem An example is as follows 1 . American Petroleum (AM) is the world's top producer of petroleum and natural gas hydrocarbons. AM has a refinery called Refinery American Petroleum (RAM) in U.S.A. which produces A-oil. Petroleum products are materials derived from crude oil (petroleum) as it is processed in oil refineries. RAM established a corporation CAM as a subsidiary to distribute product A-oil in Europe. Then, AM sells petroleum to RAM, that sells the A-oil to CAM which then sells it to approximately 1000 third-party retailers in Europe. The function performed by CAM are that of purchase of inventories of product A-oil and the sale of these inventories to final retailers. Both, RAM and CAM buy products (petroleum and A-oil) at negotiated transfer prices in order to maximize the global profit of the firm. In calculating the product's price, it must be considered the costs and taxes involving for the sales transactions of petroleum from company AM to company RAM, those involving the sales transactions of A-oil from company RAM to company CAM and finally, the costs and taxes involving the sales to the retailers.
The formulation of the transfer price for the multidivisional firm considers a vertically integrated supply chain. The game consists of N divisions or players (denoted by
) which jointly make their decisions to maximize the global profits of the firm. For solving the problem, the multidivisional firm should compute the optimal strategy under an allocation scheme able to get the global profit maximization. We develop a cooperative game model for computing the transfer pricing for a multidivisional firm based on a multi-objective approach.
Let us consider for . Because of the existence of economies of scale, we consider that the division's unit production cost is dependent on the production quantity. Then, the unit production cost which is incurred by division l when the division sells (e.g.: transactional costs, raw materials, components, and their per period inventory costs in dollars) at each level
We suppose that all the division are located in different marketing areas, therefore they face independent demands l q , costs
and taxes
. Then, the division's utility l U for each level 
3.The cooperative game model 3.1. Pareto set
The Pareto set can be defined as [6, 7, 11, 12] 
with the Pareto front given by
Constraints
Multidivisional firms look for coordinate its divisions in order to maximize the global profit of the firm after cost-tax through the transfer pricing decision. For instance, if a given upstream division is located in a lower-cost-tax jurisdiction, then increasing the transfer price results in an increase in the firm's after-cost-tax profit. To prevent
Remark 2. For practical reasons and improving the flexibility of the model we propose to establish bounds on both p and q .

Optimal weights selection
Let define the min and max allowed bounds as follows
Suppose that these bounds are a priory given as
According to [4, 5] 
Final result
-The optimal individual utility is given by 
Introducing the "slack" vectors tend to the set  X of all solutions of the original optimization problem (7), that is, 
where
is the solution of the original problem (7) with the minimal weighted norm which is unique, i.e., We also need the following corolary.
Corolary 7.
Under the assumptions of the Theorem 6 above there exist positive constants  C and  C such that
The gradient method
Consider the following recurrent procedure for finding the extremal point (19) we should have
Let us prove the following simple result. 
Regularized penalty function
Let us introduce the following regularized penalty function: 
The recurrent procedure
For maximizing the utility let us consider the following recurrent procedure for finding the extremal point
and the first-order derivative of 
Conclusion and future work
The transfer pricing problem results essential in resource allocation and global firm profit for a multidivisional firm which employs optimization goals to set internal prices of goods that are sold between subsidiaries or divisions of the firm. Usually, each division estimates the revenues or profits of each opportunity and selects the best opportunity. As a result, the transfer prices system focuses on the maximization of divisional income, leading the divisions to achieve the goals of the firm through sub-optimization. However, sub-optimizations by individual divisions do not result in an optimum for the firm.This paper presented a new modeling framework for transfer pricing schemes based on cooperative game theory considering cost and tax policies. The study provided decision makers with a useful tool for supporting the design of global strategies for transfer-pricing, considering different variables of optimization (price and quantity) and establishes a flexible model after cost-taxes profitable configuration. The proposed model integrate financial issues for vertically integrated supply chains. There are relatively few models of global profit maximization reported in the literature for large-scale organizations. Accordingly, we consider that the implementation of transfer pricing models for global profit maximization represents a fundamental opportunity that must be seriously considered by large-scale multidivisional firms.
We proposed a method for computing the transfer pricing for a multidivisional firm based on a multi-objective approach for representing a cooperative game. For computing the strong Nash equilibrium we employed the minimal distance to the utopia point. We suggested the use of the Tikhonov's regularization to guarantee the convergence to a single (strong) equilibrium point. We proposed a method based on a penalized programming approach for computing the regularized strategies of the game. We developed a programming method to solve the successive single-objective constrained problems that arise from taking the regularized functional of the game. In addition, we implemented a recurrent procedure based on the gradient method to solve the regularized problem and finding the Pareto optimal strategies. We proved that in the regularized problem the functional of the game decreases and finally converges, proving the existence and uniqueness of strong Nash equilibrium. We also presented the convergence conditions and compute the estimate rate of convergence of variables  and  corresponding to the step size parameter of the regularized penalty method. We provided all the details needed to implement the method in an efficient and numerically stable way.
In terms of future work, there exist a number of challenges left to address. One interesting technical challenge is that of developing a numerical method for implementing the results presented in this paper. We also are considering to extend the 
To prove that, by the Schur lemma [23] , it is necessary and sufficient to prove that
We have for the function 
